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ACTION.
Must be brought against the Party named in the Contract-.Novation
-Trustee.-An action, based upon a written contract itself, can only be
brought against the party named in the instrument; hence, an action
of assumpsit cannot be maintained against a railroad company, based
upon a written contract, signed by, and in the name of, the trustees of
the mortgage bondholders of such road: Chaffee v. Rutland Railroad
Co., 53 Vt.
There could not be a novation of parties in this case; because the
trustees had bound themselves-not binding the company-and one of
them was also president of the defendant company; and acting in this
double capacity, he could not contract with himself; could not dis-
charge himself and put the company in his place: Id.
A court of chancery could charge upon the trust property the legiti-
mate expenses incurred in managing it; but not even this upon the
bondholders personally. Id.
Distinction between the powers of an agent and trustee : Id.
The plaintiff, being a stockholder in the .defendant company, is
charged with knowledge of the capacity in which the trustee was
acting: Id.
AGENT. See Bills and Notes.
Travelling Salesman-Apparent Authority to Collect as well as Sell.
-An agent (a travelling salesman) of the plaintiffs sold goods to the
defendants. By the contract the defendants were to pay the agent in
three months; and did. Held, that such payment was a defence to an
action brought by the principals; and this, on the ground that they
held their agent out to the public, as having competent authority; that
it was within, the agent's apparent authority, though not his actual, to
collect for what he sold: Putnam v. Prench, 53 Vt.
nd this is so, although the bill, rendered by the principals to the
tefendants, on sending the goods, contained these words, "Payable at
I Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
* From J. W. Spaulding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 72 Maine Reports.
3 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 55 Maryland Reports.
4 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 73 Missouri Reports.
5 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 14 of his Reports.
* From Edwin F. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Vermont Reports.
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office," the defendants never having seen them, and being guilty of no
negligence in not seeing them : Id.
Erect of Mingling his Own and his Principal's Property.-Where
an agent commingled the money of his principal with his own, without
the knowledge of the principal, and with the commingled money pur-
chased hides, in the execution of his agency, so far as the creditors of
the agent are concerned, they belonged to the principal; but if the
agent, without the knowledge or fitult of the principal, commingles his
own property with that of his principal, so that the same is incapable
of separation, he and the principal become tenants in common of such
property, as to the agent's attaching creditors: Safford & Co. v. Gallup
53 Vt.
Contract in his own Name, but for Principal-Partnership Firm as
Agents-Act of One of them-Demurrer.-Where a sealed instrument
is executed by an agent, with authority therefor, and it appears by
the whole instrument that it was the intention of the parties to bind
the principal, that it should be his deed and not the deed of the agent,
it must be regarded as the deed of the principal, though signed by the
agent in his own name : Purinton v. Security Life Ins. Co., 72 Mle.
Where two persons, constituting a firm, are made agents, and the
power conferred upon them is joint and several, the execution of any
instrument within the scope of their authority, by one or both, would
be a valid execution : Id.
Thus, upon an agreenmnt commencing, "This agreement made between
Fletcher & Bonney, of Boston, superintendents of New England agen-
cies for the Security Life Insurance and Annuity Company, of New
York, of the first part, and Stephen 0. Purinton, of the second pairt,"
and ending, "In witness whereof the said parties have set their hands
and seals. John W. Fletcher, Supt. N. E. Agen. (seal), Stephen 0.
Purinton, (seal)," everything in the body of the instrument being ap-
propriate to an agreement with the company, and inappropriate to an
agreement with the agents of the company, an action may be main-
tained by Purinton against the company, if the agreement is authorized
by the company, for a breach of the covenants of such agreement: Id.
Where the declaration alleges an instrument to be the deed of the
defendant, it must be so regarded upon a demurrer to the declaration,
if it could be, legally, the deed of the defendant: Id.
ASSIGNMENT.
Debts-lndivisible without Consent of Debtor.-A creditor cannot,
without the consent of his debtor, make a valid assignment of a part of
his claim: Beardslee v. Morgner, 73 Mo.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Evidence not Admissible to Change the Meaning of the Acceptance
of a Draft, as apparent on its Face.-On the 25th of July 1877, L. &
C. drew on H.: " You will please pay to E. & Q. $2583, to be taken
from amount of purchase-money of the house purchased by you, when
they have entirely completed their contract dated June 18th 1877."
Across'the face H., on the 26th July, wrote: "Accepted; payable
when due under the contract, out of the purchase-money." At the
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same time E. & Q. receipted as follows: "Received of H. his accept-
ance of L. & C's. order of $2583, payable when due under the contract
out of the purchase-money of $4500." On the 16th February 1878,
L. & C endorsed on the draft: "The contract of E. & Q., dated June
18th 1877, for painting, glass and glazing of nine houses on North
Boundary Avenue, is completed to our entire satisfaction, according to
their specifications" The acceptor refused to pay the draft, and in the
action against him, he offered evidence of a contract other than that
referred to on the draft, between him and the drawers, and of which
the payees had no knowledge. Held, that no such evidence was admis-
sible; and that the acceptor was liable: .unting v. Emmart, 55 Md.
Promissory Note-Secured by Deed of Trust-Bona fide Pur-
chaser-Trustee-Agent of.-One who purchases a negotiable promis-
sory note, secured by a deed of trust, before maturity and without
knowledge of payments made upon it, is entitled to have the deed of
trust enforced for the full amount of the note: Goodfellow v. Stillwell,
73 Mo.
One who purchases a note secured by a deed of trust which authorizes
the trustee to receive payment, will be deemed to have constituted the
trustee his agent for that purpose, if he does not revoke the authority
so given : Id.
Promissory Note-Stipulation for Attorney's Fee.-If an obligation
for the payment of money, otherwise in the form of a promissory note,
contain a stipulation that in the event of failure to pay the same at
maturity the maker shall pay, in addition to the debt and interest, an
attorney's fee for collecting the same, it will lose its character as a
promissory note; and in determining the time within which the defend-
ant must answer in a suit on such an instrument, it will be treated as a
mere contract: First National Bank of Carthage v. Jacobs, 73 Mo.
CLUB.
Power of Expulsion of Member- Validity of Rule- Conduct Iijuri-
ous to Character and Interests of Clu.-The court will not interfere
against the decision of the members of a club professing to act under
their rules, unless it can be shown, either that the rules are contrary to
natural justice, or that what has been done is contrary to the rules, or
that there has been mala fides or malice in arriving at the decision:
Dawkins v. Antrobus, L. R., 17 Chan. Div.
One of the rules of a club provided, that a general meeting might
alter any of the standing rules affecting the general interests of the
club, provided this was done with certain formalities and by a certain
majority. Held, that a rule providing for the expulsion of members
who should be guilty of conduct injurious to the interests of the club,
was within the regulation, and could be validly passed by a general
meeting: Id.
The plaintiff, a member of the club, sent a pamphlet which reflected
on the conduct of S., a gentleman in a high official position, also a mem-
ber of the club, to S., at his official address, enclosed in an envelope on
the outside of which was printed "Dishonorable Conduct of S." The
committee being of opinion that this action was injurious to the char-
acter and interests of the club, called upon the plaintiff for an explana.
VOL XXIX.-102
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tion, which he refused to give. They then, in pursuance of the by-laws,
called on him to resign; and as he did not comply with their recommen-
dation, they duly summoned a general meeting, at which a resolution
was passed by the requisite majority expelling the plaintiff from the
club. Held, that the court would not interfere to restrain the commit-
tee from excluding the plaintiff from the club: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Distributions, Statute of-Intestate domiciled in England-Child
Legitimated by Subsequent Marriage-Foreign Law.-The Statute of
Distributions being a statute not for Englishmen only but for all per-
sons, English or not, dying intestate and domiciled in England, and
applying universally to persons of all countries, races and religions
whatsoever, the proper law for determining the " kindred" under that
statute, is the international law adopted by the comity of states. There-
fore, a child born before wedlock, of parents who were at her birth
domiciled in Holland, but legitimated according to the law of Holland
by the subsequent marriage of her parents, held (by JAMES and
COTTON, L. JJ., dissrntiente LusH, L. J.), entitled to a share in the
personal estate of an intestate dying domiciled in England as one of her
next of kin, under the Statute of Distributions: In, re Goodman's
Trusts, L. R., 17 Chan. Div.
Boyes v. Bedale, 1 H. & 3. 798, disapproved: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
False Pretences.-To constitute a criminal false pretence, ,. misrepre-
sentation must relate to a past event or existing fact, not to something
to be done in the future : Stocking v. Howard, 73 Mo.
DAMAGES. See Interest.
EQUITY. See Action.
Receiver-Ijuncton.-The discharge of a receiver furnishes no
ground of appeal. Nor does the rescission of an interlocutory order of
sale, which determined no right: Washington City, &c., Railroad Co.
v. Southern Maryland Railroad Co., 55 Md.
Where one creditor cannot be injured by the dissolution of an injunc-
tion, granted on the filing of a bill by creditors against a corporation;
and its continuance would defeat the plans for the re-organization of
the corporation entered into by the creditors : and would be inconsis-
tent with previous orders in the cause; there is no equity that would
justify the court in maintaining the injunction at the sole instance of
one creditor as against all the other creditors, as well as the corpora-
tion : Id.
ESTOPPEL.
Delivery Bond for Goods taken in Execution.-The obligors in a
delivery bond, which recites a levy of execution, are estopped in an
action on the bond from pleading that there was no levy: .undLey v.
Filbert, 73 Mo.
EVIDENCE. See Negligence.
AdmissiZbility-Practice.-Where an offer is made generally of a
mass of testimony complex in its character, and the whole of it is
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objected to, it is error to exclude the whole, if any part of it is adinissi-
ble; but in such case it must appear, that some part of the testimony
offered is clearly admissible: Eckenrode v. The Chemical Co. of Canton,
55 Md.
Depostions-Practice.-It is too late after the trial has commenced
to object to depositions, on the ground, that they were taken without
notice. That objection should be made before trial by motion to sup-
press: Holman v. Bachus, 73 Mo.
Husband not a Competent Witness- When-Accompanying Circum-
stances-Damages-Punitory and Compensatory.-When the wife is
the substantial party to a suit, her husband is not a competent wit-
ness. Evidence of the circumstances under which an assault was com-
mitted, is admissible, either in aggravation or in mitigation of damages.
Not to excuse defendant from making full compensation for any actual
injury he has inflicted, but for the purpose of showing either that cir-
cumstances of malice, gross outrage, oppression or insult, did or did
not accompany the act. If there were no such circumstances, compen-
satory damages ouly can be recovered: and if such damages only are
asked, the motive of the defendant is wholly immaterial, and can have
no bearing on the amount of recovery: Joice v. Branson, 73 Mo.
GIFT.
Voluntary Conveyance of Furniture and Articles to Wife by Letters-
No Declaration of Trust-Subsequent Will of Husband.-A husband,
by three letters written and signed by him and handed to his wife, gave
her furniture and other articles for her sole and absolute use. He after-
wards made his will, bequeathing certain legacies and making other dis-
positions of his property, and giving the residue of it to trustees, in
trust for his wife for life, with remainder to six nieces absolutely. The
furniture and other articles were, at the time of her husband's death,
in the house which had been occupied by him and his wife, and the
whole had been used by them in the ordinary way. Held, that the
furniture, &c., formed part of the husband's estate: In re Breton's
Estate, L. R., 17 Ohan. Div.
Baddeley v. Baddeley, 9 Oh. D. 113 and lbx v. Hawks, 13 Ch. D.
822, observed upon; and Milroy v. Lord, 4 D. F. & J. 264, followed.
Id.
GUARANTY.
Contract- Collateral and Original.-Where 0. H. signed a contract
with L., the concluding paragraph of which was: "I, C. H., hereby
agree to be responsible that said L. shall faithfully perform and keep
this agreement on his part ;" Held, 1. That C. H. was a guarantor
only; 2. That an action upon that contract against L. and 0. H.,
jointly, cannot be maintained: Smith v. Loomis, 72 Me.
The case of Norris v. Springer, 18 Ale. 324, considered : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Evidence.
Right of Distress by a Landlady-An Agreement by her Husband to
the Contrary.-A tenant's property was distrained on by Mrs. L., for
rent in arrear due her. The tenant had previously agreed in writing
to surrender his lease to Mrs. L's. husband in his own right. He acted
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as her agent to collect her rents. There was no proof that Mrs. L.
authorized or ratified the agreement or a suspension of her right of
distress. In an action against Mrs. L. and her husband to recover
damages fbr an alleged illegal distress, it was Held, that the tenant
could not recover: Cahill v. Lee, 55 Md.
General Engagements of Married Woman-Separate Estate.-Held,
by MALINS, V. (., that the general engagements of a married woman
entitled to separate estate will be enforced by a court of equity against
such separate estate as she has at the time when judgment is given,
including (if her husband be then dead) estate limited to her separate
use, without power of anticipation. Held, on appeal, that they can lie
enforced only against so much of the separate estate to which she was
entitled, free from any restraint on anticipation, at the time when the
engagements were entered into, as remains at the time when judgment
is given, and not against separate estate to which she became entitled
after the time of the engagements, nor against separate estate to which
she was entitled at the time of the engagements subject to a restraint on
anticipation; Pike v. Fitzgibbon; Martin v. Fitzgibbon, L. R., 17 Ch.
Div.: Id.
INJUNCTION. See Equity.
INTEREST
Action for Damages-.egligence.-Interest is not recoverable in an
action for the loss of property destroyed through negligence: DeSteiger
v. The Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., 73 Mo.
LEGACY.
Rule as to Time of Payment and the Allowance of lnterest.-With
respect to general legacies, the law has prescribed, as a general rule,
that such legacies shall be raised and satisfied out of the testator's
estate at the expiration of one year from his death. If not paid at the
expiration of the year, interest from that time will be allowed as dam-
ages, and interest on a legacy will not be computed from a period prior
to that time, unless the will clearly expresses the intention that interest
shall be reckoned from an antecedent time or event: Welsh v. Brown,
14 Vroom.
To this general rule there are certain exceptions, in cases of (1) a
legacy in satisfaction of a debt; (2,) a legacy to the testator's minor
child or one to whom the testator is in loco parentis, and there is no
provision for the maintenance of the legatee; (3,) where the bequest is
of an annuity; (4,) where the bequest is of the residue of the testator's
estate, or of some aliquot part or proportion thereof, in trust, to pay the
interest or income to a legatee for life, with a gift of the principal over
at his death. In these cases interest will be allowed from the testator's
death .d.
A legacy of a specific sum of money-the interest whereof is payable
annually to one for life-the principal being payable after his death
to other persons, is not an exception to the general rule with respect
to the payment of interest on legacies. The executor is not required
to set apart the principal sum before the end of the year; and,
until that be done, there is no fund to produce interest for the life
tenant : .d.
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LIBEL.
Pleadings-ew.paper.-In a declaration for publishing a libellous
article in a newspaper, it is not necessary to aver that the publication
was made to divers persons or to any third person ; it is enough to aver
that the libel was printed and published in a newspaper; Sproul v.
Pi'lsbury, 72 Me.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Arrest on Insufficient Affidavit.-It is no defence to an action for
malicious prosecution, to show that the affidavit made by the prosecutor
was insufficient in law to authorize the arrest and prosecution which
followed: Stocking v. Howard, 73 Mo.
MORTGAGE.
Power of Sale-Notice to Mortgagor or his Assigns.-A mortgage
contained a power of sale with a proviso, that the mortgagee was not to
execute the power, without giving notice to the mortgagor or his
assigns. The mortgagor assigned his equity of redemption by way of
mortgage to a second mortgagee. Held, that such second mortgagee
was entitled to receive notice of the first mortgagee's intention to exer-
cise his power of sale, and was entitled to damages from him for default
in giving such notice: Hoole v. Smith, L. R., 17 Chan. Div.
NEGLIGENCE.
Burden of Proof-Practice-Surprise.-The burden ig on the plain-
tiff, in an action on the case for an injury arising from the negligence
or want of care of the defendant, to show that he was in the exercise of
ordinary care, or that the injury was in no degree attributable to want
of proper care on his part: Benson v. Titcomb, 72 Me.
When a party is surprised by new and unexpected evidence, he should
at once move for delay, and not await the chances of a verdict: Id.
ORDINANCE. See Statute.
PARTNERSHIP. See Agent.
Dissolution by Court-Date from which Dissolution is ordered.-In
an action for dissolution of partnership on the ground of disputes between
the partners, where there is no distinct breach of the partnership
articles, the dissolution will not be made retrospective, but will be
ordered from the date of the judgment: Lyon v. Tweddell, L. R., 17
Chan. Div.
Besch v. Frolich, 1 Ph. 172, followed: Id.
Subrogation-Attaching Creditor-tortgage on Partnership and
Private Pro(erty to Secure Partnership Debt.-When a partner mort-
gages his private property to secure a partnership debt, which is also
secured by a mortgage on the partnership property, he stands surety for
the partnership; and is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of a
mortgagee; and the creditors of such surety, are entitled to the same
right of subrogation as the surety himself; the partnership property
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being a primary fund, the private property a collateral, pledged to pay
the debt: Bank of Royalton v. Cusshng, 53 Vt.
As between a subsequent mortgagee of the partner's private property,
who, having attached the other partner's interest, and having purchased
the original mortgage, foreclosed the one on the partnership property
and an attaching creditor of the partnership property, who, having paid
the decree in the foreclosure suit, brings his bill to foreclose both mort-
gages, such creditor is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the
first mortgagee. The redemption was payment: Id.
Doctrine of subrogation and its application stated : it rests in justice,
not contract; it applies to sureties, and not to a stranger, nor, ordinarily,
a levying creditor: Id.
PLEADING. See Agent.
POWER.
Intention to Execute.-The intention to execute a power, either by
will or any other instrument, must appear by a reference in the instru-
ment to the power, or to the subject of it, or from the fact that the
instrument would be inoperative without the aid of the power: Foos v.
Scarf et al., 55 Md.
SALE.
Contract-Goods to be Delivered by Instalments-Failure as to one
instalment-Right to Cancel Contract.-The defendantin October 1879,
sold to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff bought of the defendant, 2000
tons of pig iron, at 42s. a ton. to he delivered to the plaintiff free on
board at maker's wharf, at 3Iiddlesborough, "in November 1879, or
equally over November, December and January next, at 6d. per ton
extra." The plaintiff failed to take delivery of any of the iron in
November, but claimed to have delivery of one-third 'of the iron in
December and one-third in January. The defendant refused to deliver
these two-thirds, and gave notice that he considered that the contract
was cancelled by the plaintiff's breach, to take any iron in November.
Held, in an action by the plaintiff for daniages, in respect of the defend-
ant's refusal (BRETT, L.J., dissenting), that by the plaintiff's failure to
take one-third of the iron in November,,the defendant was justified in
refusing to deliver the other two-thirds afterwards: Honck v. Muller,
L. R., 7 Q. B. Div.
The decision in Hoare v. Rennie (5 K. & N. 19), held to be right by
BRAMWELL and BAGOALLAY, L.JJ., and wrong by BRETT, L.J. Id.
SALVAGE. See Shipping.
SHIPPING
Pilot-Salvage.-When a pilot has assisted in navigating a vessel
from a dangerous situation to a safe- anchorage, the test, whether he is
entitled to be remunerated for salvage services, is not, on the one hand,
whether the vessel was at the time. of succor in distress, or, on the
other hand, whether she was then. damaged; but the test is whether
the risk attending the services to the vessel was such, that the pilot
could not be, reasonably expected to, perform them for the ordinary
pilot's fees, or even for extraordinary pilotage reward.. A vessel was,
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during a heavy storm, being driven to leeward towards dangerous sands;
her captain was ignorant of the locality, and her loss appeared almost
inevitable : some pilots, seeing her danger, put off to sea at the peril of
their lives in order to assist her; they were unable to board her by rea-
son of the height of the sea ; but by preceding her and signalling to
her, they guided her to a safe anchorage. The vessel had sustained
no damage. .ield, that the pilots were entitled to be renumerated for
salvage services: Akerblom v. Price, L. R., 7 Q. B. Div.
SLANDER.
Of Ttle-Pleading.-In actions for slander of title, the 124th sect.
of the Practice Act is applicable, so that any meaning deemed advisable
by the plaintiff, may be imputed to the words: Andrew v. Deshler, 14
Vroom.
In pleading, it is sufficient to allege that the words are false and
malicious, without laying a scienter, even when the words may have
been part of a privileged communication: Andrew v. Deshler, 14 Vroom.
STATUTE.
City Ordinance imposing Penalty-Authorization by Councils after
Penalty lncurred.-After a building was erected in violation of a city
ordinance, and the right to recover the penalty under it had accrued to
the fire department, the common council passed a resolution authorizing
its erection. Held, that such after-authority, without any resolution to
remit the penalty already incurred, constitutes no defence to the action
to recover the penalty: State, Clark, Pros., v. Fire Department of
Elizabeth, 14 Vroom.
SUBROGATION. See Partnership.
SURETY.
Judgment against Principal-Liability of Surety.-In the absence
of special agreement, a judgment or an award against a principal debtor
is not binding on the surety, and is not evidence against him in an
action against him by the creditor, but the surety is entitled to have
the liability proved as against him in the same way as against the prin-
cipal debtor: Exparte Young; it re Kitchen, L. R., Oh. Div.
Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35, followed: Id.
TRIAL.
Trial on Merits-Effect of Argument.-When, at the trial, the parties
agree to amend the issue and try the case on the merits, such agreement
has the effect merely of waiving exceptions as to matters of form, and
does not, in any other respect, affect the legal rights, on either side
Banghart v. Flummerfelt, 14 Vroom.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See Action.
Liability of Trustee.-When a trust has been determined by the
accomplishment of the purposes for which it was created, and the trus-
tee's bond has been surrendered, and he has been practically discharged
by a performance of all the trusts, he is not thereby necessarily released
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from responsibility. When the trustee has performed all the trusts,
reconveyed the balance of the trust property, and rendered his accounts
to the cestui que trust, which are by the latter received in final settle-
ment, subject to rectifications in relation to interest and conipensation,
assumpsit for money had and received may be maintained by the cestui
que trust against the trustee to correct the accounts, and receive any
balance in his favor, upon a proper re-stating of the accounts; Howard
v. Patterson, 72 Me.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Restrictive Covenant- Constructive Notice-Lessor's Title.-A pur-
chaser or lessee having notice of a deed forming part of the chain of
title of his vendor or lessor, has constructive notice of the contents of
such deed, and is not protected from the consequences of not looking at
the deed, even by the most express representation on the part of the
vendor or lessor that it contains no restrictive covenants, nor anything
in any way affecting the title: Patman v. Harland, L. R.,' 17 Chan.
Div.
WAY.
Adverse Possession-Way occupied by the Public--Presumption.-
Merely using a way, open to, and occupied by the public, for the pur-
pose of getting water for cattle and the family, has no tendency to prove
that the use is adverse; but permissive: O'Neil v. Blodgett, 53 Vt.
Such occupancy or use, with the public, raises the presnmption that
it is not adverse; which the defendant must meet and overcome by evi-
dence: Id.
The use must not only be open, notorions and continuous; but under
a claim of right, brought to the attention of the plaintiff: Id.
Right of Way from Nrcessity, or by lmplication.-When the real
estate of a deceased person is divided among the heirs by commissioners
appointed by the Probate Court, a right of way, of necessity or by
implication, may exist over one part to another part of said real estate:
Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt.
If such right of way is appurtenant to that portion set out as dower,
and not simply appurtenant to the freehold estate of the dowager, it is
not extinguished on the death of the widow; and passes to a grantee,
or purchaser: Id.
Distinction, as to a right by implication, between a partition among
heirs, and a purchase by a stranger; Id.
So far as it is a question of necessity, reasonable, not strict, necessity
is the test; but such right is determined not on the ground of necessity
alone, but by the acts of the parties and in the light of circum-
stances: Id.
WITNESS.
Examination of-Practice.-A witness cannot, without leave of the
court, be re-examined on a matter as to which he has been previously
examined; but the ground of objection must be specifically stated when
he is recalled, or his testimouy will not be excluded. The rule, how-
ever, does not prevent the recalling of a witness in rebuttal: Osborne
v, O'Reilly, 34 N. J. Eq.
